Law and Governance in the 21st-century Regulatory State by Solomon, Jason M.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Popular Media Faculty Scholarship
4-1-2007
Law and Governance in the 21st-century
Regulatory State
Jason M. Solomon
University of Georgia School of Law, jsolomon@uga.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Popular Media by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Solomon, Jason M., "Law and Governance in the 21st-century Regulatory State" (2007). Popular Media. 3.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_pm/3
7 AdvocateFall 2007/Winter 2008
Law & Governance
in the 21st-century regulatory state
By Assistant Professor Jason M. Solomon
Editor’s note: This  
is adapted from a  
forthcoming essay in  
the Texas Law Review, 
and footnotes have 
been removed.
In 1996, a Democratic President, Bill 
Clinton, famously declared: “The era of 
big government is over.” 
The question for U.S. policymakers 
and legal scholars ever since has been: 
what is taking – indeed what should 
take – the place of the “command-and-
control” post-New Deal regulatory state? 
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egal scholarship and pedagogy on 
the regulatory state are at parallel, 
important junctures, and two new 
books stand at the cutting edge. 
The first, Law and New Governance 
in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006), 
edited by Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott, 
is a collection of works by some of the leading 
scholars in the “new governance” field.
The new governance scholars have both described and laid the 
theoretical foundation for what they see as promising and innovative 
efforts to address public problems. 
These efforts attempt to be less hierarchical, more transparent and 
more democratic than traditional top-down forms of regulation.
The second, The Regulatory and Administrative State: Materials, 
Cases, Comments (Oxford University Press, 2006), by Lisa Heinzerling 
and Mark V. Tushnet, is one of the first 
casebooks for a class on the regulatory state 
and was no doubt influential in helping 
to persuade Harvard’s faculty that adding 
such a class to the first-year curriculum was 
feasible and desirable as part of their recent 
curricular reform.
Moreover, as the first in Oxford University 
Press’ 21st Century Legal Education series, 
an unusual foray by the elite academic 
publisher into books for American legal 
education, it will no doubt be influential 
in shaping both what comes next in the 
series and for curricular reform at many law 
schools. 
In this review, I aim to link these two 
books and the developments in the legal 
academy for which they stand: the scholarly 
effort to rethink the role of the state in the 
21st century and the curricular effort to 
make courses on the regulatory state a core 
part of legal education. 
I think both books are tremendously important and largely suc-
ceed on their own terms. But I argue in this review essay that they 
share a common flaw: a lack of attention to the “adversarial legalism” 
that pervades American policymaking and implementation. 
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE
Under a traditional, command-and-control regulatory model – 
embodied in the post-New Deal administrative state in the United 
States and the harmonization efforts of the European Union – the 
state sets rules or standards, through the legislature or agencies del-
egated power by the legislature, and private actors must comply with 
those rules. The state enforces those rules through inspection and 
other means, sometimes with the help of private attorneys general. 
But the command-and-control model has come under attack in 
the last few decades on a number of fronts. Primary among them is 
the inefficiency and stickiness of the rulemaking process.
In a world of uncertainty, legislatures and agencies are unable to 
predict what the best rules will be down the road, and the mecha-
nisms for monitoring and adjusting the rules in light of experience 
are severely lacking.
As Michael Dorf, one of the leading new governance scholars, puts 
it, “in the conditions of modern life, people increasingly find that 
their problem is not so much an inability to persuade those with dif-
fering interests or viewpoints of what to do; their problem is that no 
one has a complete solution to what collectively ails them.” 
Moreover, scarce state resources mean agencies are unable to suf-
ficiently help private actors comply, enforce the law, or monitor and 
update rules in light of experience. 
New governance, then, arises out of this critique of the command-
and-control model. 
Under the rubric of “democratic experimentalism,” scholars draw-
ing on a pragmatist tradition have presented compelling case studies 
of new modes of regulation that incorporate robust public participa-
tion, benchmarking and information-shar-
ing to solve public problems.
Administrative law scholars are observing 
that the traditional model of the adminis-
trative state, where regulatory agencies with 
expertise issue rules that regulated entities 
must follow, is giving way to a mode of 
“collaborative governance,” where agencies 
and industry representatives work together 
to define and revise standards. 
Together, these scholarly strands make 
up the field of “new governance,” a series 
of efforts to reconceive the relationship 
between the state and those it governs.
Like many new paradigms, “new gover-
nance” defines itself in large part opposi-
tionally. 
The kinds of regulation encompassed 
in the term “new governance” tend to be 
less prescriptive, less top-down and more 
focused on learning through monitoring 
than compliance with fixed rules. 
As one scholar put it, new governance mechanisms share empha-
sis on regulation through “centrally coordinated local problem-
solving.” 
Both in defining the problem to be addressed and devising solu-
tions, new governance forms emphasize provisionality and revisabil-
ity in light of experience.
The public agency acts to help local actors learn from one another 
about best practices and ensures transparency and public participa-
tion in problem-solving. 
In such regimes, public and private actors interact in increas-
ingly complex and collaborative ways to address problems of public 
policy.
Law and New Governance is an important collection of essays on 
new approaches to governance in the United States and the European 
Union. Building off a conference at Cambridge University, the essays 
in this collection pursue three parallel lines of inquiry. 
First, the essays provide case studies that describe and evaluate 
L
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ongoing experiments in new governance in the United States and 
the European Union. 
Second, the essays explore the relationship between law and new 
governance, with some exploring the “gap” between the two domains, 
others positing that new governance is “transformative” of law, and 
others pointing to a “hybrid” approach that might prove enduring. 
Third, the essays look at the relationship between new governance 
and constitutionalism. 
In the EU context, the authors are largely asking whether new 
governance mechanisms can help provide a raison d’être for the 
European Union; while in the United States, the new governance 
scholars largely pose the model as a possible answer to the question 
of what the role of the state is now that the “era of big government 
is over.” 
The regulatory experiments examined in the case studies differ in 
their origins. 
Most of the U.S. examples are what we might call “bootstrapping,” 
bottom-up examples of reform, originating either within administra-
tive agencies or from particular institutional actors. 
In the EU, however, new governance efforts have been more 
deliberate and top-down as the EU Commission has funded and 
otherwise promoted research on such efforts.
The principal new governance method in the EU, known as the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC), involves “the setting 
of guidelines or objectives at EU level with the elaboration 
of Member State action plans or strategy reports in an itera-
tive process intended to bring about greater coordination and 
mutual learning in these policy fields.”
Drawing on the international relations literature, some 
authors discuss this as a form of “soft law.”
Looking across the case studies, new governance seems less a 
structural or institutional description, and more a description of a 
particular epistemic approach toward the task of governance. 
It draws on John Dewey’s pragmatist notion of learning by 
doing, and with its emphasis on benchmarking and rolling best 
practices, draws from the “lean production” model of business 
organization.
Are law and new governance compatible?
If “new governance” regimes are not a set of rules passed by demo-
cratic institutions that must be followed by others, though, are they 
really law? 
As Charles Sabel and William Simon, two of the leading new 
governance theorists, articulate the concern, doubts emerge as to 
whether new governance forms can still be “law in the sense of hold-
ing officials accountable for their acts and assuring that citizens are 
otherwise secure in the enjoyment of their rights.” 
For a few of the authors, there is this gap between law and new 
governance that may be insurmountable. 
On one version of this thesis, law is simply blind to new gover-
nance schemes, as evidenced most distinctly by the failure of the EU 
Constitution to mention such forms of regulation. 
In another, more dangerous account for new governance propo-
nents, law actively resists or obstructs attempts at new governance. 
An example is Orly Lobel’s account of how the courts struck down 
an innovative occupational health and safety program because it did 
not comply with formal rulemaking requirements.
For most of the authors, though, law and new governance can 
interact in fruitful ways. 
De Búrca’s own contribution tells a successful hybrid story of how 
judicially enforceable rights of nondiscrimination in the EU are 
enforced with rolling best practices about how to promote equality. 
Joanne Scott and Jane Holder’s discussion of the water framework 
directive in the EU is another example of this sort of hybrid: binding 
laws with new governance implementation regimes. 
In the United States, Louise Trubek explains how medical malprac-
tice litigation can lead to new governance mechanisms to improve the 
quality of care. 
For these authors, law and new governance can peaceably coexist.
For Sabel and Simon, transformation of law by new governance is 
inevitable and desirable. 
They remind readers of the “enduring insight of nineteenth-
century social theory that great innovations only arise in conditions 
that undermine their antecedents.” 
New forms of governance are emerging because of the limits of 
law, and further undermining of law ought to be 
embraced.
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, signed into law by President George W. Bush, 
is a working example of new governance in the United States. The act was created to 
strengthen performance-based accountability for all public schools and students.
For those concerned about accountability, Sabel and Simon point 
out the very notion of accountability as a meaningful concept has 
been undermined. 
Under the traditional, hierarchical notion of principal-agent 
accountability, the principal, a democratically elected sovereign 
(through the legislature) hands down rules, and the administrative 
agent implements those rules and is disciplined if she goes astray by 
an independent judiciary tasked with enforcing accountability as a 
“matter of pedigree.” 
If this account was ever realistic, it is no longer. 
The legislature is both not particularly democratically representa-
tive and not able to lay down rules with enough specificity so as to 
eliminate discretion. 
In such a regime, the new governance theorists argue that a more 
“dynamic accountability,” where agents are forced to transparently 
justify their decisions and are evaluated by peers making similar 
decisions, better fulfills the desideratum of a government that is 
responsive to its citizens.
Most new governance scholars, then, welcome the challenge that 
new governance poses to law. 
Many see the concept of law as no longer a useful one in analyzing 
the modern regulatory state, and they are not alone. 
As another prominent U.S. scholar of regulatory theory recently 
put it, perhaps we ought to “bracket” the concept of law altogether, 
“suspending its claim to describe some aspect of our society in a use-
ful or convincing way” and deploy the alternative concept of “policy 
and implementation” in understanding today’s administrative state.
Is new governance compatible with constitutional-
ism? 
Even if new governance is compatible with law, a further question 
arises: can it reach constitutional scale? 
In fact, we currently have an ongoing experiment on that very 
question: the principal domestic policy innovation of the current 
administration, the federal No Child Left Behind education law. 
New governance scholars greeted No Child Left Behind, and the 
state-level reforms in Texas and Kentucky on which it was based, 
with great excitement.
The law acts at the national level much like the EU’s Open 
Method of Coordination operates at the supranational level: setting 
goals but leaving it to the states to come up with plans for achieving 
the goals. 
Though it constituted an unprecedented federal level of involve-
ment in state and local education policy, states and local school dis-
tricts were granted autonomy to devise their own plans for achieving 
progress, and even for defining the standards themselves. 
In return, the federal government required accountability mea-
sures including data to ensure students, disaggregated by race and 
income, were making “adequate yearly progress.” 
Public participation was guaranteed by provisions requiring the 
federal Department of Education to include parent representatives 
on a committee that would review the implementing regulations 
and other provisions, giving parents the right to get information 
from their school districts about the qualifications of their children’s 
teachers.
If No Child is successful, it will be strong evidence that large-scale 
new governance regulation can work in the United States and may 
have broad political support as the basis for any “new constitutional 
order” in the United States.
The jury is still out on the success of No Child. 
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On the positive side – indeed, this may make anything else mere 
quibbles – there is substantial evidence that the math and reading 
scores of disadvantaged students have gone up since the passage of 
the law, though the causal connection is not established. 
On the other side of the ledger, teachers report increased time 
“teaching to the test” that may crowd out other important educa-
tional goals. 
Scholars and policymakers have raised the question of whether the 
benefits of the law outweigh the unintended consequences of No 
Child, including encouraging states to lower academic standards, 
pushing poor and minority students out of schools, and creating an 
environment that discourages strong teachers from taking jobs in 
schools with high numbers of disadvantaged students.
Is this a successful regulatory model both for educational policy 
and other domains? Again, the jury is still out. 
For new governance scholars, the model’s strength is its ability to 
learn from experience and to update both the goals of the regulatory 
scheme and the means in light of experience. 
In the No Child context, states can both learn from their own 
experience and the experience of other states through the bench-
marking coordinated at the federal level. 
But when one talks about experimenting at a local level in light 
of uncertainty about how best to proceed, one thinks of the familiar 
federalism idea of states as “laboratories of democracy.” 
Even if it is different than federalism, is the new-governance, No 
Child model really better? 
One leading scholar of education policy, Harvard’s Richard 
Elmore, thinks not. He points out that before No Child states were 
experimenting with various kinds of performance-based accountabil-
ity, and No Child “narrows the domain of experimentation drasti-
cally and hence limits the amount we can know.” 
He believes annual testing is one way to measure performance, but 
it is not the only way and may not be the best way. Under No Child, 
it is the mandatory way.
From a different direction, scholars have criticized No Child for its 
mix of federal involvement but leaving flexibility to the states – pre-
cisely the recipe prescribed by new governance advocates. 
As James Ryan puts it, perhaps the federal government “should 
get off the federalism fence.” Either the political and institutional 
dynamics are such that the states can be trusted to establish and 
enforce strong academic standards, or they can not. And if they 
cannot, then perhaps the federal government ought to just prescribe 
national standards, as a precursor to No Child passed under President 
Clinton did, and as was supported by the first President Bush. 
To be sure, perhaps political reality would stand in the way of such 
standards – but that is not the new governance proponents’ argu-
ment. Their argument is that providing states flexibility is better as a 
policy matter because of the uncertainty about ends and means.
THE REGULATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Public law in legal education
As scholars rethink the role of today’s regulatory state, educators 
are exploring its proper role in legal education. 
Since the rise of the administrative state in the United States with 
the New Deal, legal education has struggled to incorporate “public 
law” courses into their curricula. 
The first courses to appear during the 1930s and 1940s were 
administrative law courses, dealing with the process by which agen-
cies do rulemaking, judicial review and other related topics. 
At roughly the same time, legislation courses grew, introducing 
students to the legislative process, and how to read and interpret 
statutes. 
After World War II, two professors at Harvard, Henry Hart and 
Albert Sacks, developed what grew to be legendary materials called 
“The Legal Process.” These materials introduced students to the 
different ways society can deal with problems, including regulation 
through administrative agencies.
The administrative law and legislation courses have remained 
staples of the upper-level curriculum, and though the legal process 
was taught in dozens of law schools in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, 
it is now only taught in a handful. 
In the meantime, beginning in the late 1980s, many law schools 
moved toward requiring some kind of “public law” course as part of 
the first-year curriculum.
Though some schools did this through an administrative law or 
legislation course, others such as Columbia, NYU and Georgetown 
developed a “regulatory state” course that focused in large part on 
questions of institutional or regulatory design. 
With Harvard’s recent adoption of such a course into the required 
first-year curriculum, and a prominent scholar of regulation and 
Vanderbilt’s dean, Edward Rubin, leading curricular-reform efforts 
both at his own school and through the Association of American Law 
Schools (AALS), the issue has come to the fore again.
Heinzerling and Tushnet’s approach -  
The book’s strategy
Into the mix steps Harvard’s Tushnet and Georgetown’s Heinzerling 
with their new book, The Regulatory and Administrative State. This 
is a new casebook designed to fill the void in the market – where 
demand may also grow if other schools follow Harvard’s lead and 
require such a course – for materials to teach an introductory course 
in public law. 
On the question of whether such a course should be required, 
Tushnet and Heinzerling are clear in the preface: “Lawyers in the 
21st-century need course materials of this sort. They are deeply 
involved in public law and the regulatory state, and need the skills 
– including the ability to read and understand statutes – associated 
with the modern regulatory state.” 
At this stage, the question of whether law students need the “skills 
... associated with the modern regulatory state” is not controversial. 
The issue is whether or not this book provides them.
This book takes as its theme the regulation of risks to human life 
and health. 
In exploring how the law regulates these areas, the book considers 
recurring issues of institutional choice, statutory interpretation, and 
market and regulatory failure. And, it is quite different from a stan-
dard administrative law or legislation book.
The book proceeds in four parts: First, it considers the basic justi-
fications for regulation in circumstances where the individual parties 
contract. 
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Second, it explores the contours of common-law regulation of risks 
to human life and health through both criminal and tort law. 
Third, the book takes up the emergence of the modern regulatory 
state as a response to the perceived failure in common-law regulation 
of risk. In doing so, it offers an introduction to statutory interpreta-
tion, administrative law and public choice theory. 
Finally, the book closes with a section on “new perspectives” on 
the regulatory and administrative state in the 21st century, exploring 
some of the same issues explored in greater depth in Law and New 
Governance.
In guiding students’ reflections on these matters, the authors put 
the students, implicitly, in the role of policymakers, asking questions 
like “what is the best institution to use in responding to” work-related 
carpal tunnel syndrome, climate change and other issues. 
As I explain further below, this perspective of the policymaker, 
or what the authors refer to in the book as the “disinterested social 
scientist,” is the primary perspective with which the authors approach 
these materials. 
More promising, in my view, are the too-rare instances where stu-
dents are asked to think about the role of lawyers. 
In one chapter, for example, students are asked to think about how 
lawyers affect the process by which individuals complain about work-
place sexual harassment or secondhand smoke – even here, though, 
the students are asked to play social scientists thinking about the role 
of lawyers, not thinking as lawyers themselves.
Part III, “The Modern Regulatory State,” is the core of the book, 
introducing students to statutory interpretation, the basics of admin-
istrative law and some modern features of contemporary regulation 
including cost-benefit analysis and information provision. 
The authors provide a solid introduction to the key administra-
tive law topics of rulemaking, judicial review, standard-setting and 
nondelegation, primarily through the principal U.S. Supreme Court 
cases and a few circuit opinions applying those cases. 
To be sure, future lawyers in a regulatory practice would have to 
take the full administrative law course, but others could be confident 
that they have a decent foundation. 
The authors also present interesting materials on regulatory design: 
cost-benefit analysis, some of the ways regulatory efforts fail and how 
providing information can be a market-based solution to regulating 
risk (but one that also has its limits, as psychological research pre-
sented indicates).
The materials on statutory interpretation, though, are inadequate, 
covering only one chapter and arguably not even that. This is a seri-
ous flaw. 
The materials on statutory interpretation consist of excerpts from 
a few classic articles – by Karl Llewellyn, Frank Easterbrook and 
Stephen Breyer – to provide an excellent introduction to the overall 
approach in interpreting statutes. 
These articles are followed by two cases – one, the classic “Holy 
Trinity” case, which demonstrates the conflict between statutory 
purpose and the text, and then a Seventh Circuit opinion interpret-
ing the Sentencing Guidelines, which features interesting, dueling 
opinions from Judges Posner and Easterbrook.
After that, the authors go right to Chevron, the classic U.S. Supreme 
Court case about judicial deference to agency interpretation of stat-
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utes, and a more recent case on that 
topic, Brown and Williamson. The 
canons of statutory interpretation 
barely appear. 
At the close of Part III, the 
authors take a welcome turn from 
the perspective of a “disinterested 
social scientist” to the perspective 
of politicians. 
In this chapter, they introduce 
“public choice theory,” the micro-
economic approach that looks at 
the self-interested incentives that 
politicians have in making regula-
tory choices. They want to run 
for reelection, they need to raise 
money for such a campaign and 
their choices are shaped by these 
realities. 
Besides the excerpts from public 
choice theory, the authors include 
an interesting essay from Harvard 
political theorist Jane Mansbridge 
questioning the premises of public 
choice theory with its focus on self-interestedness, its acceptance of 
“adversary democracy” and the absence of deliberation from this view 
of public life. 
No doubt the new governance scholars would agree. 
But all must face the question of how exactly to get past the reality 
of “adversary democracy” and toward the aspiration of greater delib-
eration in public life, a theme I will return to later.
This book is ambitious. On the theory that students will learn 
more by “seeing the subjects in a unified course,” Heinzerling and 
Tushnet designed the book as an introduction to “the reasons for reg-
ulation, the ways in which regulation can go awry, the choice of legal 
institutions for regulation, the choice of regulatory instruments, and 
the theory and practice of statutory interpretation.” But in attempt-
ing to do so much, the authors risk accomplishing relatively little. 
The authors believe that today’s lawyers need to know “both an 
understanding of statutory interpretation and an understanding of 
the reasons for regulation.” 
However, it is not clear why exactly they need the latter. 
To be sure, when Willard Hurst first designed such a course at 
Wisconsin during the 1940s, the place of the administrative state 
itself was much more tenuous. In that context, a course that spent 
some time demonstrating the limits of the common law or the need 
for scientific expertise as part of the executive branch might have 
made sense. 
But today, the administrative state is an inescapable part of our 
legal system. No one is suggesting it is unnecessary in our complex 
modern society. 
What is needed is more of an approach that focuses on training 
future lawyers to make arguments about how to interpret statutes. 
Put simply, depending on the client and the situation, a lawyer 
will have to argue either that a client or his conduct is not covered 
by a statutory provision or is cov-
ered – and future lawyers need to 
be trained in how to make these 
kinds of arguments the same way 
they are trained to make doctrinal 
arguments. 
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 
AND LAWYERS 
What will the American regula-
tory state look like in 20 years? To a 
certain extent, both books are mak-
ing wagers on that answer. 
I argue that how each book deals 
with that question has an impact 
on the other and could help shape 
the very answer itself. 
The argument goes like this: a 
key and largely unexplored variable 
in the scalability of new gover-
nance in the United States is our 
culture of “adversarial legalism,” to 
use Robert Kagan’s term. In not 
grappling with that issue, the new 
governance literature currently falls short. 
The question is: why do new governance scholars think interests 
accustomed to battling over policy will put down their swords, share 
information and collaborate? 
Perhaps the reason why new governance is much more widespread 
in the European Union, and may remain that way, is because of this 
lack of adversarial legal culture. But this variable is largely unexplored 
in the new governance literature thus far. 
Indeed, the adversarial legal culture may carry over to new gover-
nance schemes. 
To take one example, Kagan cites the Educational for All 
Handicapped Children Act as an example of a law that relies on due 
process rights and private lawsuits for enforcement, as opposed to an 
administrative enforcement mechanism that would not rely on the 
courts. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests the same lawyers who challenged the 
schools under that law have also started bringing legal challenges 
under No Child Left Behind. 
Moreover, parents and their lawyers are starting to use the No 
Child Left Behind right to transfer a student out of a low-performing 
school to challenge school rezoning decisions.
This is not to say these developments are necessarily bad, just 
that the shift from a rights-based, court-centric model to a problem-
solving, collaborative one seems tentative at best.
In order for new governance to succeed, perhaps it will be neces-
sary to amend the Administrative Procedure Act to limit judicial 
review considerably. 
Will lawyers accept this? Regulated entities? Will citizens? Should 
they? 
Alternatively, maybe it does not matter to the success of the new 
governance project if affected parties still have the opportunity to 
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challenge regulations once formulated. But this would seem an odd 
conclusion since continued opportunity for challenge would reduce 
the incentive to actually participate and collaborate in the policymak-
ing process. 
If the claim, then, is that the collaborative process itself will lead to 
less adversarial positioning for strategic advantage, then that requires 
some empirical support, particularly in light of the evidence to the 
contrary with respect to negotiated rulemaking. 
The scholars in Law and New Governance largely position them-
selves as social engineers, technocrats deciding the optimal govern-
ment programs. 
But if the new governance scholars are going to succeed in under-
standing the circumstances in which such schemes will work, they 
must take greater account of how the schemes arise and are imple-
mented. 
For better or worse, lawyers are generally not trying to work with 
others to reach the “best” social outcome – whether it be lower drug 
use, higher school test scores or safer workplaces. Rather, they are try-
ing to advance their client’s interests in the particular context. 
But our adversarial legal culture is not fixed, either, and one 
explanatory factor here may be how we train tomorrow’s lawyers. 
Here, Heinzerling and Tushnet miss an opportunity.
To be sure, they do not ask students to play the role of warrior liti-
gators, but nor do they ask them to play the role of problem-solving 
collaborators either. In doing so, they fail to maximize the chances 
that tomorrow’s lawyers will act to change the adversarial legal culture 
in which they will operate.
Like the new governance scholars, The Regulatory and Administrative 
State generally takes a neutral, technocratic perspective, that of a 
“disinterested social scientist, attempting to determine what choices 
among institutions would best serve the public interest.” 
Focusing on the general topic of risk regulation, the book asks the 
questions: when is government regulation necessary and desirable, 
and what form can and should regulation take? These are important 
and interesting topics, but a lack of attention to adversarial legalism 
means this book falls short. 
Tushnet and Heinzerling’s failure to attend closer to the role of 
lawyers and adversarial legalism is not just a pedagogical failure, then, 
it is a scholarly one as well. 
If the relative success of the regulatory instruments depends in 
part on the role lawyers play, and the degree to which adversarial 
legalism can gum up the works, so to speak, then comparative insti-
tutional analysis that fails to look at these issues is incomplete and 
inaccurate.
The example of No Child Left Behind helps illustrate this com-
mon weakness. 
With its accountability measures, the law was a promising example 
for the new governance scholars of the promise of democratic experi-
mentalism (if properly implemented). 
But only by examining how such a law has and could play out “on 
the ground” can one begin to understand the circumstances under 
which such a model of regulation can work and, where it fails, how 
it can be improved. And the way it will be implemented is not by 
everyone holding hands and working together for the public interest. 
It is through a complex pushing and pulling, with lawyers for teach-
ers’ unions, school districts and government agencies battling over 
what constitutes compliance with the law. 
Only by examining this “new governance” innovation in the con-
text of our adversarial legal system can it be properly evaluated. 
CONCLUSION
Put differently, the fate of the project at the heart of each book is 
inextricably linked to the other. 
For the new governance scholars, the success of new governance 
as an overarching regulatory theory depends, at least in the United 
States, on the next generation of lawyers having the skills and inclina-
tion to overcome the culture of “adversarial legalism” that pervades 
policy implementation today. That is, in determining the success of 
new governance as a model for the 21st-century regulatory state, 
the training and receptivity of lawyers may well be an explanatory 
variable. 
By the same token, for public-law curricular reformers like Tushnet 
and Heinzerling, their book only succeeds if it provides adequate 
tools to the next generation of lawyers to be effective in the 21st-
century regulatory state. 
To be sure, there is an empirical and unanswerable question here: 
What will the U.S. regulatory state look like in 20 years? But, I 
fear that the new governance scholars may be more right about the 
future than Tushnet thinks, and that the materials and skills in The 
Regulatory and Administrative State are therefore inadequate prepara-
tion for the post-regulatory state. 
The students who are trained by The Regulatory and Administrative 
State will understand what it means to challenge agency-issued regu-
lations in the courts under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
but not how to work with a school district to develop a plan to meet 
the goals of the No Child Left Behind law or a hospital developing 
a system to protect information privacy under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). And yet, the latter tasks 
are likely to be more common than APA challenges for lawyers in 
2020, perhaps even today.
At the same time, the new governance scholars could benefit from 
the kind of comparative institutional analysis that Heinzerling and 
Tushnet teach their students. 
For example, is the No Child Left Behind method of allowing 
states the flexibility to define standards for students really likely to 
lead to higher student achievement than if the federal government 
set the standards themselves? If so, why? 
This kind of comparative analysis is frequently absent from the 
inevitability narrative advanced by some of the new governance 
scholars.
As we move more or less toward a new constitutional order in the 
United States, we must understand the kinds of regulatory mecha-
nisms that are likely to be effective and train tomorrow’s lawyers to 
effectively represent their clients within such a regulatory frame-
work. 
Together, these two books are a promising start.
